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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-(3)(a):
(3)
The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)
a
Appeals;

judgment

of

the

Court

of

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-5:
The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of
Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme
Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).

iv

I.

Questions Presented For Review,
Whether the Court of Appeals failed to follow the

prior decisions of this Court and other panels of the Court
of Appeals 1) by increasing the amount of damages awarded by
the district court to respondents without any showing that
the district court abused its discretion in setting damagesf
and 2) by awarding respondents and denying petitioners a
share of their attorneys1 fees when petitioners were the
prevailing party below and the only parties possessing a
contractual right to the recovery of fees.
II.

Opinions Issued By The Court Of Appeals.
The only opinion issued by the Court of Appeals,

and the opinion which is the subject of this Petition, is
dated December 20, 1988.

A copy of the opinion is included

in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit "A."
III. Grounds On Which The Jurisdiction Of This Court Is
Invoked.
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be
reviewed was entered on December 20f 1988.

On January 13#

>

1989, this Court granted Petitioners1 Ex Parte Motion For
Extension Of Time To File Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.
This Court possesses jurisdiction to consider this Petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(b) and discretionary
jurisdiction to grant this Petition pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(5).
1

IV.

Statement of the Case,
A.

Nature Of The Case,

This action was brought by petitioner Stacey Properties ("Stacey") in the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County against respondents Ben Wixenf Francine Wixenf
Bernie Goler and Bonnie Goler, doing business as Golwix
Properties, seeking to recover amounts owed to Stacey by respondents under an $80,000 promissory notef and to defeat
respondents claimed "offsets" against their note payments.
Respondents

asserted

counterclaims

against

Stacey

and a

third-party claim against J. Ron Stacey, individually, seeking to offset their note payments with damages allegedly incurred as a result of breaches of warranty and contract by
Stacey.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In Lower
Courts,

The District Court,

The case was tried to the

District Court, the Honorable David E, Roth presiding, on
May 28, 29 and 30f 1986.

Because the amount of the damages

and offsets proved by respondents at trial was more than the
accrued amount in default under the promissory note, Judge
Roth concluded that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate
the due date of the principal balance of the note, and was
not entitled to recover its attorneys' fees pursuant to the
2

terms of the promissory note.

(See Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law at 11 13, included in the Appendix hereto
as Exhibit "B", hereinafter "F. & C . M ) .

Judge Roth also

concluded that respondents were not entitled to an award of
their attorneys1 fees.

(^d. at 1121).

Stacey appealed contending that the District Court
erred in concluding that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the principal balance of the note or an award of a
portion of its attorneys' fees.

Respondents cross-appealed,

arguing that the District Court erred in setting the amount
of damages that were awarded to respondents in regard to two
of respondents' counterclaims.

Respondents further argued

that they were entitled to a share of their attorneys' fees
in proportion to their success on their counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision in regard to Stacey's claims on appeal.

Converse-

ly, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents' limited
success on their counterclaims entitled them to a share of
their attorneys' fees.
District

Court

had

Further, it concluded

incorrectly

assessed

the

that the
amount

of

damages to which respondents were entitled under one of
their claims, and therefore, directed that the award be increased. Thus, the matter was remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings in accordance with the decision.
3

C.

Statement Of Facts Relevant To This Petition.

On May 22, 1984, Stacey sold several commercial
properties located in and around Ogden, Utah, including the
Ogden Post Office, to the respondents pursuant to a written
"Letter Agreement.11
Agreement
"C").

(F. & C. at 111).

is included

(A copy of the Letter

in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit

As partial payment for the properties, respondents

executed a promissory note payable to Stacey in the amount
of $80,000, with monthly installments payable in the amount
of $731.79, beginning on June 1, 1984.
496).

(Id[. at 1(4; R-

(A copy of the note is included in the Appendix

hereto as Exhibit "D").
payments,

respondents

With the exception of two early
failed

to

make

payments owing to Stacey under the note.

the

installment

(.Id. at 1(1(3 and 6;

R-496-497) .
Instead
asserted

of

numerous

making

their

"offsets"

payments,

against

their

respondents

payments

for

damages allegedly incurred by them as a result of Stacey's
alleged

breach

Agreement.
Complaint

of

warranties

(R-73-76).
in the Second

In

set

forth

response,

in

the

Stacey

Letter

filed

a

District Court, seeking amounts

owing under the note, acceleration of the principal balance
of the note, plus expenses and attorneys' fees associated

4

with enforcing the provisions of the note in the face of
respondents' offset claims.
Complaint).

(See F. & C. at 116; R-497;

Respondents defended by asserting that the note

could not be accelerated in light of respondents' offset
rights; further, they asserted counterclaims and third-party
claims

against

petitioners

for

money

damages

flowing from Stacey's breaches of warranty.

allegedly

(See Answer; R-

37; Counterclaim).
At trial, the accrued amount of unpaid installment
payments owing under the note was $16,099.38; respondents
asserted offsets and claims for damages under their counterclaims in the total amount of $88,329.21.

(F. & C. at 1MI 6,

9; R-497; 294). Of that amount, respondents sought approximately

$22,758.00 for expenses

incurred by them in re-

placing a roof-top air conditioning unit at the Ogden Post
Office.

The balance of the alleged damages related to a

plethora

of

respondents.

other

expenses

allegedly

incurred

by

(See Id.).

After hearing the evidence, Judge Roth determined
that the respondents had proven their entitlement to damages
in the total amount of $20,362.94.
505).
in

(F. & C. at 1(13; R-502-

Of that amount, $6,899.39 was awarded by Judge Roth

regard

to

the

air

conditioner

5

replacement, and

the

balance was awarded for certain other expenses or damages
incurred by respondents.

(See Id.).

A digression is necessary at this point to address
the District Court's award of damages in regard to the air
conditioner.

Judge Roth concluded that/ at the time of the

closing of the transaction on May 22, 1984, the rooftop air
conditioner had only approximately 25% of its useful life
remaining

under

normal

conditions.

(.Id.

at 1111(a)(3)).

Based upon the advanced age of the unit, Stacey warranted
only that the unit would be "in working order" and would be
"operative at closing".

(Letter Agreement at 111, Exhibit

"C", hereto) (emphasis added).

Although respondents knew

the air conditioning unit was old, they did not inspect it
prior

to

closing

and

did

not

cause

any

springtime

maintenance or "check up" to be performed on the unit prior
to its start-up by the Post Office for the summer season.
(R-457; 581-82).
Post office personnel testified that they turned
the unit on for the season on May 19 or May 26, 1984, without checking the oil or refrigerant level, (R-112; 134), a
practice which post office personnel admitted could lead to
a "catastrophe" concerning the unit.

(R-133-34).

There-

after, on May 29, 1984, post office personnel observed that
the unit was not working. (R-112; Exhibit D-7).
6

On June 22, 1984, the Holbrook Company inspected
the unit and found
M

trippedflf

that the oil safety switch had been

shutting down the unit because it was low on

refrigerant and was leaking oil.

(R-171-73; 179). Holbrook

employees testified that they fixed the unit on June 26,
1984.

(.Id.)

Additionally, their work records, as well as

the post office's records, expressly stated that, before
Holbrook left, the unit was "checked for operation", further
evidencing
order.

that

the

unit

was

operable

and

in

working

(R-139; 166; 175-76; 181; 218-19; Exhibits D-7; P-

25, P-25A).

Holbrook charged respondents $1,030.32 for the

June 26, 1984 repairs.

(R-181; Exhibit P-25A).

After almost a month of no reported problems with
the unit, Holbrook again inspected the unit on July 25, 1984
and found that it was operating, but that it was running on
"high suction pressure."

(R-187-188).

Thus, Holbrook de-

cided to take the unit to its shop for further "inspection";
from that inspection, Holbrook concluded that the compressor
was damaged, probably as a result of the unit being run
while it was low on oil.
Holbrook

employees

(R-189; 210).

acknowledged

that

Significantly,

the damage

to the

compressor could have occurred within "a short period of
time" and could have occurred as a result of lack of oil in
the unit at the 1984 spring start up.
7

(R-219-220).

A single Holbrook employee testified that his estimated cost of repairing the unit at the end of the summer of
1984 was $19,000 to $20,000; based on the high estimated
cost of repair, he therefore recommended that respondents
purchase a new unit.

(R-211).

Respondents did not solicit

any other estimates for repairing the unit and simply determined

to

replace

$22/758.00.
contacted

the

(R-224).

Stacey

unit

at

a cost

Significantly,

concerning

any

of

approximately

respondents

problems

with

never

the unit

throughout the spring and summer of 1984 until after they
had replaced the unit.

(R-427).

Further, Stacey was never

given the opportunity to inspect the old unit before it was
destroyed by Holbrook in 1984.

(R-221).

After hearing testimony from at least five different persons concerning the unit, Judge Roth concluded that,
"according to the circumstantial evidence11, the unit was not
"in working order and operative on May 22, 1984."
at 1111(a)(1)).

(F. & C.

However, Judge Roth also concluded that, in

light of the evidence and respondents1 knowledge that they
were purchasing an old unit, respondents would receive a
windfall if they were awarded the entire cost of replacing
the unit with a new one. (Id. at 11(a)(3); 1113(a)(2); R582).

He therefore concluded that respondents would be

8

fairly compensated by an award of twenty-five percent of the
cost

they

incurred

in

replacing

the

new

unit,

which

percentage was based upon the approximate remaining useful
life of the replaced unit under normal conditions. (Id).
Judge

Roth

ordered

that

the

air

conditioner

damages, as well as the other damages proved by the respondents, be credited against the defaulted installment payments
due under the note.

(F. & C. at 1118).

Since those damages

were slightly greater than the amount in default, Judge Roth
concluded that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the
principal balance of the note, but that respondents were to
resume their note payments after credit was given for their
damages.

(^d.)

Judge Roth further concluded that, since

Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the note, it was not
entitled to a share of its attorneys' fees.

(IdL at 1(20).

Similarly, he concluded that respondents were not entitled
to an award of their attorneys' fees.

(Ld. at 1(21).

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Failed to Follow This Court's
Previous Decisions in Reversing the District Court's
Damage Award in Connection With the Air Conditioning
Unit,
The Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Roth had

erred in setting the amount of damages in connection with
the air conditioning unit at twenty-five percent of the re9

placement cost of the new unit.

(Court of Appeals Decision

at p. 5). The Court reasoned, without any analysis of the
evidence, that such an award failed to place the respondents
in as good a position as if Stacey had not breached its
warranty regarding the air conditioner.

(I_d.)

Therefore,

it ordered the District Court to increase the damage award
to $19,000-$20,000, which, according to one Holbrook employee, was the estimated cost of repairing the unit in August
of 1984.

(^d.)

As is shown below, however, that conclusion

wholly disregards the evidence before Judge Roth and is contrary

to

numerous

decisions

of

this

Court

vesting

the

District Courts with a large degree of discretion in setting
the amount of damages.
On

several

recent

occasions,

this

Court

has

observed the following regarding the appellate review of the
amount of damage awards:
In fixing damages, the trial court is
vested with broad discretion and the award
will not be set aside unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial
court neglected pertinent elements, or was
unduly influenced by prejudice or other
extraneous elements.
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah
1984); Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d

315, 318

(Utah

Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d
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1983);

1125, 1130

(Utah 1982).

As the trier of fact is in the best position

to assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility and
bias of the witnesses, an appellate court "is constrained to
look at the whole of the evidence in a light favorable to
the trial court's findings, including any fair inferences to
be drawn from the evidence and all circumstances shown."
Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d
1977).

751, 753 (Utah

As long as there is some rational basis for the

computation of damages, the finder of facts1 determination
should

be

upheld

on

review.

See,

e.g.,

Clayton

v.

Crossroads Equipment Co., supra; Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson,
448

P.2d

709, 712

(Utah

1968);

see generally

Hall

v.

Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Utah 1977)("[I]f the evidence
is

such

that

reasonable

minds

may

differ

as

to

the

conclusion to be drawn . . . this court should not interfere
with . . . [the trier of fact's] determination thus made.").
The Court of Appeals, by concluding that the only
proper award of damages was $19,000 to $20,000, impliedly
held that the District Court was constrained to accept the
respondents' theory of damages because it had accepted the
respondents1 theory of liability.

This Court, however, has

rejected that notion on numerous occasions, including in a
case involving remarkably similar facts to this one.
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In

Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 357
P.2d 496 (Utah I960), the plaintiff sought damages incurred
as a result of having to repair a burned out compressor
unit.

Although the evidence in the record indicated that

the plaintiff

incurred $3,580.52 in repair expenses, the

jury awarded only $2,500. On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant
argued that the jury's award constituted legal error and
that the only proper award of damages was $3,580.52.
Court disagreed.

This

It noted:

[T]he jury was not obliged to follow abjectly the plaintiff's evidence, but had
the right to place their own evaluation
upon the repairs made under their undoubted prerogative of judging the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence.
357 P.2d at 497; see also Even Odds, Inc. v. Nelson, supra
at 712 ("[The trial court] is not bound to slavishly follow
the evidence and figures given by any particular witness.");
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1976) (trial
court

was

not

compelled

to

accept

successful

party's

testimony concerning its damages).
In Arnold Machinery, this Court explained some of
the factors "which the jury could reasonably have thought to
justify

finding

plaintiff."

an

amount

less

than

that

claimed

by

JA. Those factors included the possibility that

12

not all of the claimed expenses were necessary, that the
amounts

charged

concerning

were

the

excessive,

repairs

was

and

that

presented

the

through

evidence
biased

witnesses who the fact-finder was entitled to believe or not
believe, in whole or in part.

Id.

Similarly, in this matter, Judge Roth was entitled
to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the sole Holbrook
employee, Bob Banford, who testified that the estimated repair

cost

$20,000.

of

the

unit

No other

in August

of

1984 was $19,000-

competitive bids were solicited, and

Stacey was not allowed to even inspect the unit before it
was

removed

Mr. Banford

and
had

destroyed.

an

obvious

(R-221-224.)
financial

interest

Further,
in

the

transaction as he sold a new unit to respondents and his
compensation

was

Holbrook Company.

based,

in

part,

upon

the

profits

of

(R-221-22.)

Beyond issues relating to Mr. Banford1s credibility
or bias, there were also significant questions concerning
whether the breach of warranty regarding the unit caused
damages of the magnitude claimed by respondents.

Again,

Stacey warranted only that the unit was "operable11 and "in
working

order"

on

the

date

of

closing,

May 22, 1984.

However, the evidence indicated that the unit was working
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and operable for several days during that period, and after
a $1,000 repair in June, operated for almost a month.
171-73; 179; R-187-88).

(R-

Indeed, the unit was operating,

albeit with "high suction pressure," when it was removed by
Holbrook on July 25, 1984.

(R-187-88).

Further, there was

evidence suggesting that the post office's start-up of the
unit in the spring of 1984, without checking the oil or
refrigerant

level, was a dangerous procedure

that, even

according to Holbrook employees, could have caused or contributed to the ultimate failure of the compressor and related problems.
Thus,

(R-219-220).
in

light

of

the

large

amount

of

rather

ambiguous testimony concerning the cause of the ultimate
demise

of

the

unit, and

in

light

of

Stacey's

limited

warranty, respondents failed to present persuasive evidence
to Judge Roth that Stacey's breach resulted in such a large
amount

of

damages.

Judge Roth properly

concluded

that

respondents would receive a windfall and be placed in a
better position than that to which they had contracted if
they were awarded $19,000-20,000. (R-582).

That decision

was well within Judge Roth's discretion and the Court of
Appeals erred in setting aside the award.

14

II.

The Court of Appeals1 Decision Concerning Attorneys'
Fees is Contrary to this Court's Prior Decisions, as
Well as Prior Decisions of Other Panels of the Court of
Appeals.
A.

The Court of Appeals Rejected Stacey's Express
Contractual Right to its Attorneys' Fees While
Recognizing Such a Right in Respondents Where None
Exists.
1.

Stacey's Entitlement to Fees.

The note contained a non-reciprocal attorneys1 fee
provision in favor of Stacey granting it the right to recover

all

attorneys1

fees

and

costs

incurred

"by

or

in

connection with" its enforcement of its rights under the
note. (See note, Exhibit "D" hereto).
Respondents refused to make payments to Stacey under the note and instead asserted "offsets" against those
payments based upon their alleged damages.

Those claimed

offsets hemorrhaged to $88,329.21 by the time of trial, well
in excess of the principal amount of the note.

In order to

vindicate its right to any payment under the note, Stacey
had

no choice but

claimed offsets.

to challenge

and

defeat respondents1

Stacey was 77% percent successful in that

regard, as it limited respondents' damages and offsets to
$20,362.94.

Thus,

Stacey

is

entitled

to

77% of

its

attorneys' fees, based upon the authority of Traynor v.
Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (parties entitled to

15

share of attorneys' fees in proportion to their success);
Cooper v. Deseret Fed, Sav. & Loan Assfn, 757 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah App. 1988) ("[A] party is entitled . . . to those fees
attributable to the successful vindication of contractual
rights within the terms of the agreement.ff) •
The Court of Appeals denied Stacey's claim by concluding narrowly

If

[s]ince Stacey's attempt to accelerate the

note was unsuccessful, Stacey was properly denied its attorneys' fees,"

(Court of Appeals Decision at p. 6.) That con-

clusion, however, wholly disregards

that Stacey's claims

were not simply to enforce the acceleration clause of the
note, but to enforce respondents' monthly payment obligations.

But for Stacey's largely successful defense of re-

spondents' counterclaims, respondents had announced their
intention to make no further payments on the note and had
effectively offset the note out of existence.
though

Stacey

was

denied

the

right

to

Thus, even

accelerate

the

principal balance, it effectively vindicated its right to
payment of the bulk of that principal balance by defeating
77% of respondents claimed offsets and damages; Stacey is
therefore entitled to at least 77% of its fees, pursuant to
the terms of the note and the above-cited authorities.

16

Rather, the attorneys' fees which respondents seek
to recover pursuant to the indemnity provision are the fees
they have

incurred

in this action attempting

their offsets of their

to justify

note payments on the grounds of

Stacey's breaches of warranty.

Clearly, such claims are not

properly characterized as claims for "indemnification".

As

this Court observed in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Company,

681

P.2d

214,

218

(Utah

1984),

a

claim

for

indemnity is different than a claim for breach of contract
or warranty, and requires proof of three elements:

(1) the

prospective indemnitee must discharge a legal obligation to
a

third

person,

(2) the prospective

indemnitor

must be

liable to the third person and (3) as between the indemnitee
and the indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged by
the indemnitor.

Thus, the "indemnity" provision in the

Letter Agreement cannot properly be invoked by respondents
to

recover

respondents'

attorneys1

their
claims

against

fees
Stacey

in

this

are

not

matter
claims

as
for

indemnity.
Additionally, even if respondents' claims against
Stacey could be considered to be claims for "indemnification" covered by § 17 of the Letter Agreement, the law is
well-established

that

a

prospective
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indemnitee

cannot

2.

Respondents' Entitlement to Fees,

Neither

the

terms

of

the

note

nor

the

Letter

Agreement contain an express attorneys' fee provision in
favor of respondents.

Instead, respondents contend, and the

Court of Appeals agrees, that Section 17 of the Letter
Agreement, expressly entitled "Indemnity", gives respondents
a right to an award of their fees.

(See Court of Appeals

Opinion at p.6; See Letter Agreement at § 17, Exhibit "C"
hereto

).

decisions

That conclusion, however, is contrary to the
of

this Court, other

panels of

the Court of

Appeals, as well as the vast majority of other Courts which
have considered the issue.
Plainly, in this matter, respondents are not seeking the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred by them in connection with their defense of third-party claims concerning
which they were indemnified by Stacey.

If such claims were

made against respondents, causing them to incur attorneys'
fees, then the language of the indemnity provision at Section 17 of the Letter Agreement clearly requires Stacey to
pay those fees.

Importantly, however, no such third-party

claims were ever made against respondents and respondents
never incurred any fees defending such non-existent claims.
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recover

its attorneys' fees incurred

right to indemnification.

in establishing its

Indeed, in Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna

Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 450 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that a prospective indemnitee can only
recover attorneys' fees incurred in "defense of the claim
indemnified against; the indemnitee is not entitled to those
fees

incurred

in establishing

its

right

to

indemnity",

(emphasis in original) (citation omitted); accord Lasar v.
Bechtal Power Corp., 727 P.2d 526, 528 (Mont. 1986); United
General Ins. v. Crane Carrier Co., 695 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Okl.
1984); Foley v. Employers Commercial Union, 488 P.2d 987,
990 (Az. App. 1971).

Therefore, for this additional reason,

the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the indemnity
provision in the Letter Agreement entitled respondents to
their attorneys1 fees incurred in this matter.
Finally, even if the Court of Appeals properly concluded that respondents were entitled to attorneys1 fees,
that conclusion does not negate Stacey's entitlement to its
fees in accordance with the terms of the note.

As observed

in Traynor v. Cushing, supra, opposing parties may each be
entitled to a share of their attorneys' fees if they both
possess contractual rights to an award of fees and they are
both partially successful on their claims or defenses.
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As

noted

above,

Stacey

was

77%

successful

respondents offsets and vindicating

in

defeating

its right to payment

under the note and is therefore entitled to 77% of its fees,
regardless

of

the

validity

of

respondents'

claims

for

attorneysf fees.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals1 decision fails to even pay
lip service to the long-standing deference this Court has
given to trial courts in setting the amount of damages.
Such deference is appropriate in light of the trial court's
superior position to assess the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses.

Further, the Court of

Appeals has seemingly misunderstood or simply declined to
follow the law concerning the award of attorneys' fees to
partially successful parties, as well as the construction of
indemnity

provisions.

For

these

reasons,

petitioners

respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this

[fa ^ day of / ^ ^ u ^ c ^ X

, 1989.

HANSEN & ANDERSON
/

CA^A/*

Dbert M. 1Anderson
Robert
William P. Schwartz
50 West Broadway, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Petitioners
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j(P -—

day of

February, 1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI to:
Clark Waddoups, Esq.
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
OPINION
(For Publication)

Stacey Properties, a Utah
limited partnership,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,
v,

Case No. 880127-CA

Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen,
Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.•
Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson.

BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from final judgment on an action to
accelerate the balance due on a promissory note. Defendants
appeal from final judgment on their counterclaim for breaches
of warranty and contract. There are three issues presented for
review. First, did the trial court err in dismissing
plaintiff's claim for acceleration of the balance owed on the
promissory note? Second, did the court err in measuring
damages to be awarded defendants on their counterclaim? Third,
did the court err in failing to award attorney fees? We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This dispute stems from the sale in May 1984 of several
commercial properties located in and around Ogden, Utah.
Stacey Properties Ltd. (Stacey), a Utah limited partnership,
and J. Ron Stacey, general partner, sold the properties to
defendants Ben and Francine Wixen and Bernie and Bonnie Goler,
general partners of Golwix Properties (Golwix). The total
purchase price exceeded $3.5 million, most of which was paid
through Golwix1s assumption of existing debt. Golwix also
executed a promissory note in the amount of $80,000 payable in
monthly installments to Stacey.
The terms of the promissory note included an offset
provision, an acceleration clause, and a provision for Stacey's
attorney fees in the event enforcement of the note became
necessary. In conjunction with the note, a letter agreement

FYHIRIT
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memorializing the terms of the sale provided for, inter alia,
express warranties on certain aspects of the properties and for
Golwix1s attorney fees for any breach of those warranties.
The note and agreement were executed on May 22, 1984. On
September 5, 1984, Golwix asserted an offset against payments
due under the note. A week later, Stacey notified Golwix that
the entire balance due under the note was being accelerated
because of Golwix*s "default." Stacey filed suit on December
5, 1984, and Golwix counterclaimed.
Trial before the court commenced on May 28, 1986. After
three days of testimony, the trial court determined that Golwix
had failed to make a total of $16,099.38 in payments on the
note by the time of trial. The court further determined that
Golwix had established offsets totaling $6,727.33 for
replacement of an air conditioner and repair of a sewer
system. Golwix was also awarded $12,250 in damages on its
counterclaim for replacement of a roof. The trial court found
that there had been no default and denied Stacey's demand to
accelerate the balance due on the note. Neither party was
found to be entitled to an award of attorney fees. Both
parties appeal the judgment.
ACCELERATION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE
Although an acceleration clause Mwill be enforced in
accordance with the agreement of the parties,- KIXX, Inc. v.
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Utah 1980), the
remedy is a harsh one "not favored in the law.M Williamson v.
Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1976).
Stacey contends on appeal that it should have been
permitted to accelerate the due date of the principal balance
of the promissory note according to the note's terms. The
pertinent provision of the note states:
In the event this Note, or any obligation
provided to be satisfied or performed under
any agreement, instrument or document
connected with or related to this Note, now
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and
in the manner required, [Stacey], at its
option and without notice, may declare the
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest
immediately due and payable and [Golwix]
agree[s] to immediately pay the same.
We examine this provision as we would a contract, since
*[p]romissory notes . . . are contracts between the parties,
and the rules of construction applicable to contracts apply to
them." First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyarisse, 647 P.2d 1268,
880127-CA
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1272 (Kan. 1982). Furthermore, "[t]he interpretation of
contract language presents us with a question of law on which
we need not defer to the trial court's construction but are
free to render our independent interpretation." Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); £££ also Ted R.
Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah
App. 1988).
Stacey claims on appeal that the ruling below discourages
unsecured loans, creates a precedent opposed to the policy of
prompt notification of default, and weakens the enforceability
of acceleration provisions in general. We disagree. The
essence of the ruling of the trial court is merely that
acceleration was premature at the time of notification and
unwarranted later because of the amount of Golwix's offset.
At the time Golwix notified Stacey of its offset claim, two
of the four monthly installment payments due had been paid.
There is testimony in the record that the parties had agreed to
postpone payment of the initial monthly installment for one
year. The remaining unpaid installment was due on September 1,
1984, four days before Golwix sent notification of its offset.
Prior to submission of its offset claim, Golwix had already
paid or deferred three of the four installment payments due.
On those facts, the court could reasonably find that no default
had occurred at the time of the attempted acceleration.
The court also found that acceleration was unwarranted
because the amount of offsets asserted by Golwix exceeded the
amount in arrears on the note. It is clear from the record
that Golwix bargained for and received a contractual right of
offset. The operative provision of the promissory note states:
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset
against any amounts due or to become due to
[Stacey] under this Note any such
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section
17 of said letter agreement or under any
other provision thereof or of any document
executed in conjunction therewith, provided,
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey]
written notice of the amount to be offset
and the specific reasons therefor.
The trial court considered this provision along with the
following provision of the letter agreement:
The properties have been inspected by
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . .
[Stacey] agree[s] to remedy any latent
defects in materials or workmanship which
arise within a one year period from the date
of closing. We represent and warrant to you
that all heating, cooling, electrical,
880127-CA
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plumbing and sewer systems at the properties
are in working order and will be operative
at closing and that the footings and
foundations are free from material
structural defects. . . . We will perform
all necessary repairs to the roof of the
Post Office building which are reasonably
required to maintain a water tight roof
surface for a period of sixty seven [sic]
months from the date of closing at our sole
cost and expense.
When Golwix incurred a $22/758 expense to replace an air
conditioner/ it referred to the warranty provision of the
letter agreement and exercised its contractual offset right
under the promissory note. These two instruments could be
reasonably construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d
1342/ 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements which are related and
executed contemporaneously must be construed as a whole and
harmonized). The trial court could also properly balance the
acceleration and offset terms of the note# giving effect to
each of the provisions of the entire agreement. Minshew v.
Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192/ 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual
provisions must be interpreted in light of the entire
agreement/ giving effect to every other provision). We
conclude that the trial court was legally correct in holding
that acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded
the total payments due on the note. See, e.g., Wells v. Cobb,
455 So.2d 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (acceleration was
improper where default had not occurred due to offset).
Accordingly/ acceleration was unwarranted prior to trial/ and
we affirm the ruling of the trial court.1
MEASURE OF DAMAGES ON COUNTERCLAIM
Stacey argues that the trial court erred in measuring
damages to be awarded Golwix on its counterclaim. Much of the
trial record is devoted to establishing the timing/ cost, and
extent of repairs needed on the various sale properties. Based
on the factual findings, the trial court determined as a matter
of law that Stacey was liable on only three of Golwix1s claimed
offsets. The court found that: 1) Stacey had breached its
contract to maintain a watertight roof at the post office
property; 2) Stacey had breached its warranty that the cooling
system at the post office was to be operative on the closing
date; and 3) Stacey had breached its warranty to remedy any
latent defects in materials or workmanship by failing to remedy
a defect in the sewer system at the shopping center property.
1. We need not reach the issue as to whether acceleration was
warranted at the time of trial since the court's award to Golwix
still exceeded the amount in arrears on the note even at that
time.
880127-CA
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Although the court awarded a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of
the sewer repairs, the replacement costs for the roof and air
conditioner were apportioned 25% to Stacey and 75% to Golwix.
This apportionment is at issue on appeal•
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are
generally "those which arise naturally from the breach and
which reasonably may be supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties or are reasonably foreseeable."
Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982). 2 "Damages
are properly measured by the amount necessary to place the
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had
been performed." Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah
1982).
A review of the amounts awarded to Golwix for the roof
leads us to conclude that this rule was properly applied. The
trial court's apportionment of the costs for roof replacement
was based on evidence in the record that a new twenty-year roof
would cost $49,000. Since Stacey had contracted to maintain
the roof for approximately five years, the court reasonably
found that Stacey should bear the cost of five years of a
twenty-year roof, i.e., 25% of $49,000, or $12,250.
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual replacement
cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was awarded 25% of the
replacement cost of $22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that
Golwix would "receive a windfall" if Stacey was held
responsible for the full replacement cost. The award, however,
fails to "place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as
if the contract had been performed." Alexander, 646 P.2d at
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to be
operable on the day of closing. What it received was an air
conditioner that was not in working order on that date. Since
the evidence indicates that the reasonable cost of repairing
the unit would have been between $19,000 and $20,000, the
court's award was insufficient to afford Golwix the benefit of
its bargain. For that reason, the award for the air
conditioner should be increased, on remand, to reflect the
reasonable cost of repair.
ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties sought, and were denied, attorney fees under
provisions of the promissory note and letter agreement. Stacey
based its claim for attorney fees on the following provision of
the promissory note:
2. We do not distinguish the breach of warranty claim from the
breach of contract claim as "[a]n action for breach of warranty
may sound in either contract or tort." Mitchell v. Pearson
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985).
880127-CA
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[Golwix] agree[s] to pay any and all costs
and expenses (regardless of the particular
nature thereof and whether incurred with or
without suit or before or after judgment/
including reasonable attorneys' fees) which
may be incurred by or in connection with the
enforcement or performance of any of the
rights of [Stacey] hereunder or under any
agreement, instrument or document connected
with or related to this Note.
Golwix based its claim for fees on the following provision
of the letter agreement:
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and
reimburse you . . . for . . . any claim
. . . (including without limitation "
reasonable attorneys* fees and expenses/ and
costs and expenses reasonably incurred/ in
investigating/ preparing or defending
against any litigation or claim), . . .
arising out of or in any manner incident/
relating or attributable to: a. any breach
or failure of any representation or warranty
given by us . . . ; b. any failure of
either of us to perform or observe . . . any
covenant, agreement/ or condition to be
performed or observed by us under this
agreement or under any . . . other
instrument . . . executed by us in
connection with this agreement; . . . or
d. the enforcement of your rights under this
agreement.

A

As a general rule, attorney fees may be recovered in Utah
only if provided for by statute or contract. Cooper v. Deseret
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483/ 486 (Utah App. 1988).
If attorney fees are recoverable by contract/ H [a] party is
entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful
vindication of contractual rights, within the terms of [the]
agreement.- Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856/ 858 (Utah 1984).
The court below found that Stacey was not entitled to an
award of attorney fees because it did not prevail on its
complaint for acceleration. We consider this finding to be in
accord with the language of the note, i.e.,
Golwix will pay
attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to accelerate
the note was unsuccessful/ Stacey was properly denied its
attorney fees.
In regards to Golwix's claim for attorney fees# the trial
court found that it was Mnot entitled to an award of fees
because [it] did not prevail on many of [its] counterclaims."
880127-CA
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The letter agreement provides, however, for the reimbursement
of Golwix1s attorney fees incurred in enforcing any claims for
breach of warranty or failure of performance. The contractual
provision is expansively written, encompassing a broad range of
potential expenses connected with rights arising under the
contract. The mere fact that Golwix failed to prevail on some
of their counterclaims does not justify a withholding of fees
to which they were contractually entitled. "Provisions in
written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should
ordinarily be honored by the courts." Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). Golwix was not only successful in its
opposition to acceleration of the note, it was also successful
on some of its counterclaims. Therefore, even with partial
success, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on
which it was successful. See Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each
party was entitled to attorney fees where each was partially
successful). We conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to give effect to the broad contractual
language and partial success of Golwix in enforcing its
contractual rights.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to Golwix.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CON'

Re^ftfrtTlf.

Garff,

Judge

- ^ ^ > < 2 ^ ^

Norman H. Jackson Trudge"
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah
limited partnership,
Plaintiff,
PINDINGS OP PACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW

vs.
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN,
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants,

Civil No. 90743

vs.
J. RON STACEY,
Counterclaim
Defendant.

This matter, having been tried to the Court on May 28,
29, and 30, 1986, and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey having been
represented by Robert M. Anderson and William p. Schwartz, and
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald
G. Russell, and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument
of counsel, hereby makes the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

May

22,

1984,

plaintiff

Stacey

Properties,

counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen,
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a
written agreement

(the

"Agreement") whereby

certain

properties

were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including
the main

Ogden

post

office

located

in Ogden,

Utah,

and

the

Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset, Utah.
2.

As partial payment for the properties, defendants

executed an $80,000 promissory note dated May 22, 1984, payable
to plaintiff

in monthly

installments of

$731.79, beginning on

June 1, 1984 (the "Note").
3.

Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1,

1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984.
4.

The Note contains a provision

concerning offsets

which states:
Contemporaneous with Makers' execution of
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement
relating to the sale and purchase of certain
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia,
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro
attributable to any breach of failure of any
representation or warranty given by Properties
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement
or any failure of either of
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them to perform any covenant to be performed
under such agreement or any such instrument.
Makers shall have the right to offset against
any amounts due or to become due to
Properties under this Note any such
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17
of said letter agreement or under any other
provision thereof . . ., provided, however,
that Makers give Properties written notice of
the amount to be offset and the specific
reasons therefor.
5.

On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written

notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office.

The

amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that
letter.
6.

Defendants did not make the September, 1984

monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the
Note after claiming said offset.

As of May 1, 1986, the total of

unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38.
7.

Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September

12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that
defendants had failed to make payments in th-» time and manner
required by the Note.

The Note provides:

In the event this Note, or any obligation
provided to be satisfied or performed under
any agreement, instrument or document
connected with or related to this Note, now
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and
in the manner required, Properties, at its
option and without notice, may declare the
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest
immediately due and payable and makers agree
to immediately pay the same.
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8.

The Agreement provides:

[Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree
to remedy any latent defects in materials or
woxfkmanship which arise within a one year
period from the date of closing. We
represent and warrant to you that all
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and
sewer systems at the properties are in
working order and will be operative at
closing . . . ., We will perform all necessary
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office
building which are reasonably required to
maintain a watertight roof surface for a
period of sixty-seven months from the date of
closing at our sole cost and expense.
9.

At trial, defendants claimed offsets against the

Note for the following items and amounts:
(a)

Ogden Post Office Air
Conditioner Replacement

$25,063.80

(b)

Commonwealth Sewer Repair

$ 1,037.83

(c)

Ogden Post Office Roof

$43,750.00

(d)

Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair

$ 7,600.00

(e)

Commonwealth Electrical Repair

$ 1,409.70

(f)

Property Tax Adjustment

$ 3,028.52

(g)

Commonwealth Fire Sprinkler

$ 1,190.00

10.

Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice

of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed
and reasons therefor.
11.

According to the evidence presented, the Court's

findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as
follows:
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a.

Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit.
(1)

The air-conditioning unit, according

to the circumstantial evidence presented, was
not in working order and was not operative on
May 22, 1984;
(2)

The air-conditioning unit had an

expected useful life of approximately fifteen
years;
(3)

On May 22, 1984, the unit would have

had approximately 25% of its useful life
remaining under normal conditions;
(4)

Plaintiff was notified by Eugene

Perren of the post office by at least May 29,
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not
operable.

Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed

to make repairs to the unit after receiving
notice from the post office that the unit was
inoperable;
(5)

Defendants incurred a total expense

of $22,758.00 to replace the air-conditioning
unit, the first installment of which in the
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984.
b.

Commonwealth Square Sewer System.
(1)

Defendants discovered a 16"-18" gap

in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within
one year of Kay 22, 1984, which gap was never
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey.

(2)

The subject gap was not discovered

prior to closing and could not have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to
its nature and location;
(3)

Defendants incurred an expense of

$1,037.83 to repair said gap.
c.

Ogden Post Office Roof.
(1)

The Ogden post office roof has

leaked on numerous occasions following
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have
failed to perform all necessary repairs which
were reasonably required to maintain a
watertight roof surface;
(2)

According to the evidence presented

by defendants, the cost of replacing the post
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof
would be $49,000;
(3)

The age of the roof at the date of

closing was approximately twelve years;
(4)

Defendants have not incurred any

out-of-pocket expenses to repair said roof as
of the time of trial.
d.

Commonwealth Square Sidewalk.
(1)

The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square

are currently in a defective condition in
several places;

(2)

The defects were discoverable by

defendants prior to May 22, 1984;
e.

Commonwealth Electrical System.
(1)

Defendants failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence that the
Commonwealth electrical system was not in
working order at the date of closing,
f•

Property Tax Adjustment.
(1)

Defendants failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the
parties1 agreement to adjust the property
taxes payable by the parties according to the
actual 1984 tax assessment.
(2)

Plaintiff moved at the start of

trial to amend its Complaint to include a
claim for the property tax proration owed
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was
granted.
(3)

Defendants have failed to make

payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata
credit.
g.

Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System.
(1)

Defendants failed to present any

evidence that the fire sprinkling system at

-7-

Commonwealth Square was not in working order
at the date of closing,
12,

These Findings of Fact shall be construed to

Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to
constitute Conclusions of Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
13.

The Court makes the following conclusions wit

respect to each of the claimed offsets:
a.

Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit.
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at

the Ogden post office was not in working
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach
of the terms of the Agreement;
(2)

Defendants would receive a windfall

if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held
responsible for the entire cost of
replacement;
(3)

Defendants are entitled to offset

against amounts due or to become due under
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is
25% of the total replacement cost of the air
conditioner incurred by defendants, together
with prejudgment interest on that amount at
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30,
1986 or $1,209.89.

-8-

b.

Commonwealth Sewer System.
(1)

A latent defect in the sewer system

at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose
within one year from May 22, 1984, which
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to
remedy in breach of the terms of the
Agreement.
(2)

Defendants are entitled to offset

against amounts due or to become due under
the Note the amount of $1,037.83 for costs
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer
system, together with pre-judgment interest
on that amount from January 1, 1985 to May
30, 1986 or $175.72.
c.

Ogden Post Office Roof.
(1)

Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have

failed to perform all necessary repairs which
were reasonably required to maintain the
Ogden post office roof in a watertight
condition in breach of the terms of the
Agreement;
(2)

Defendants would receive a windfall

if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held
responsible for the entire cost of a new
roof;
(3)

Defendants are entitled to recover

against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award

-<*-

of damages proximately resulting from said breach
in the amount of $12,250, which is 25% of the
cost of a new "twenty-year" roof;
(4) Because

defendants had

incurred

no

out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the Note.
(5) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey shall have no
further

obligations

under

the

Agreement

with

respect to the Ogden post office roof from and
after May 30, 1986.
d.

Commonwealth Square Sidewalk,
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with

respect

to

the

Commonwealth

Square

Shopping

Center were not latent defects within the terras
of the agreement;
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award
with respect to said sidewalks.
e.

Commonwealth Electrical System.
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence

that the Commonwealth

electrical system was not in working order on May
22, 1984.
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(2)

Defendants are not entitled to any

award with respect to said electrical system.
f.

Property Tax Adjustment.
(1)

Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff

and J, Ron Stacey are entitled to recover
$958.10 from defendants jointly and
severally, together with prejudgment interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1,
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property
taxes which were paid or should have been
paid to defendants by certain tenants.
(2)

Defendants are not entitled to any

award with respect to property taxes.
g.

Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System.
(1)

Defendants presented no evidence

that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system
was not in working order at the date of
closing.
(2)

Defendants are not entitled to any

award with respect to said system.
14.

The time at which a default justifying

acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted
acceleration.

No default had occurred on September 12, 1984

justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by
plaintiff was of no effect.

15.

Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note

at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by
the defendants to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded
amounts due under the Note on that date.
lfi. Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff
is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial,
17.

Because defendants are entitled to a money

judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the
Note at this time would be inappropriate.
18.

The total amount awarded to defendants, including

prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative
monthly installments under the Note of $16,099.38 (as of May 1,
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such
amount has been fully satisfied.
19.

Pursuant to stipulation, defendants' Fourth

Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
20.

Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for

acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees.
21.

The defendants would be entitled to an award of

attorney's fees if they had simply defended the case
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims.
22.

All parties shall bear their own costs.

23.

These Conclusions of Law s h a l l be construed to be

Findings of Pact to the e x t e n t that the same may be found to
c o n s t i t u t e Finflings of Fact.
DATED t h i s /*>

-c-y^^^..

day of ^ d g u s t , 1986.
BY THE COORT:

'-driage David E. Roth
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert M. Anderson of
Hansen and Anderson
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
and i , Ron Stacey

Roffa^d G. RuSSeipol
Lar^en, Kimball, Parr & Crockett
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimaints

-i i-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
William P. Schwartz, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

May 1, 1984

Mr. Ben Wixen
Ms. Francine A. Wixen
Dr. Bernie Goler
Ms. Bonnie Goler
1911 South Commerce Center, E.
Suite 211
San Bernadino. California 92408
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler:
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties,
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common.
1.

Property Sold

The properties to be sold include the following:
a.
1-18, inclusive.

Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units

b.

Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah.

c.

Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah.

d.

Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah

e.

Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah.

All of the said properties are more fully described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been
inspected by you and are purchased "as is". Said buildings
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in
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materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at
the properties are in working order and will be operative at
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the
date of closing at our sole cost and expense.
2.

Purchase Price

The purchase price for all of the foregoing property
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the
following terms and at the times indicated:
a.
$10,000 cash paid this date, to our
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their
trust account.
b.
The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase,
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set
forth in paragraph 4).
c.
The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set
forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by this
reference made a part hereof.
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d.
The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27,
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree
to execute a deed of trust.and promissory note in form
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement
with the bank dated March 27, 1984.
e.
Assumption of Post Office building mortgage
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and
agree to pay.
3.

Conveyance

The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp.,
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to
the grantees.
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this
agreement to Val Ban Corp., a California corporation.
Val Ban Corp.. pursuant to the contractual obligation
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on
July 12, 1983, shall complete said purchase according to the
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written
notice of the same, Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights,
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp. to
Mr. and Ms. Wixen, Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in
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paragraph 2(c) above, provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume
such promissory note obligation.
4.

Prorations and Closing Costs

The rents, taxes, insurance, and utilities will be
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in
November, 1984, at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes
is known. It is contemplated that you will make similar
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in
connection with the closing.
5.

Leases

We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right,
with the giving of notice or lapse of time or both, to
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder, except as
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference.
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases.
6.

Personal Property

At the time of closing a bill of sale without
warranties evidencing the sale by us to you of the equipment
and personal property located at the Eastern Winds Restaurant,
a complete list of which is set forth on Exhibit M D" attached
hereto, will be provided to you relating to such equipment and
personal property.
7.

Preliminary Title Reports

We have delivered to you this date copies of
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Home Abstract Company
relating to the properties being sold, together with copies of
various documents which are referred to in the said title
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports,
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which,
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract
Company. An ALTA Owner*s Extended Coverage Title Policy in the
amount of $3,530,104.95 will be provided to you through Home
Abstract Company at our expense.
8.

Allocation of Values

The allocation of the purchase price of the respective
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a
Schedule approved by all parties at closing.
9.

Commissions

We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50* thereof, in connection
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any
commission in connection with the subject transaction.
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10.

Warranties

At closing we will assign to you all contract
warranties from third parties pertaining to the subject
properties as they relate to any personal property, the
structures, or any component parts thereof and we will make a
reasonable effort to locate and deliver copies of all documents
in our files with respect thereto. In addition, we will
deliver to you at closing all original building contracts,
plans, permits, and other documents pertaining to the
properties purchased or the construction of same. We have
advised you most of the properties were constructed without
written building contracts.
11.

Possession

Possession of the properties being sold shall be
delivered at the date of closing.
12.

Closing Date

The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as
used herein shall be May 4, 1984, or as said date shall be
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us, each party
shall have all remedies provided for by law.
13.

Representations

We have previously represented to you and we hereby
affirm, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that the
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We
have provided you with copies of any special permits or
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings,
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, we will defend
said action at our sole cost and expense.
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the laws of
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary
action, require no action by or in respect of. or filing with.
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the
documents by which we were created and are governed which are
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the
properties or operate any portion thereof.
14.

Termite Inspection

At the closing we will provide you with a standard
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the
properties sold hereunder.
15.

Survey

At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets,
rights of way. or rights of access.
16.

Conditions

(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is
expressly conditioned upon the following:
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security
Bank of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27.
1984. or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual
agreement between you and the bank;
b.
That all representations and warranties made
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date
of closing as if made on such date;
c.
That we shall have fully performed and
complied with all of the obligations to be performed
by us in this agreement;
d.
That you shall have received an opinion from
our attorneys. Berman & Anderson, in the form set
forth on Exhibit "E" hereto;
e.
That the assumption of the Post Office
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon
shall not exceed 11 1/2% per annum; and
f.
That there shall have been no material
adverse change in any of the properties or title
thereto since April 1. 1984.
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties
is expressly conditioned upon the following:
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank;
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this
agreement;
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage
being assumed by you.
17.

Indemnity

We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for, and with
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage,
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including
without limitation reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, and
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating,
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim),
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character,
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or
attributable to:
or
in
or
by

a.
any breach or failure of any representation
warranty given by us contained in this agreement or
any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance
transfer, or other document or agreement executed
either of us in connection with this agreement;

b.
any failure of either of us to perform or
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full,
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed
or observed by us under this agreement or under any
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement
executed by us in connection with this agreement;
c.
the assertion by any person of any claim,
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which
relates to the properties or which in any manner
affects title to the properties which arises out of
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on
or prior to the closing date; or
de
the enforcement of your rights under this
agreement.
18.

Survival.

The representations, warranties and covenants given by
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement,
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation
made by you.
19.

Waiver and Modification.

This agreement may not be amended, modified,
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants,
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except
by written instrument executed by all of us and for. or. in the
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant,
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a
condition to such party1s obligations hereunder, shall
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from
said breach.
20.

Successors in Interest; Assignment.

This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations
of any obligations for which provision is made in this
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written
consent of the other party.
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our
understanding* please execute this agreement where set forth
below.
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^CLcepted and agreed to this
Z-lLday pt Aprils 1984.

Ben Wixen

=
*-l Wixen
W i x e n ^
Francine

&^d
Bernie Goler

l^nuyLcL
Bonnie Goler

4066a
050184

Jh&i ^L

May 25, 1984

The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler.
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification is attached hereto as
Ehibit "A11.

^(JflO

^*^^
Francine A. Vixen

U EXHIBIT
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EXHI3IT "A"

PROMISSORY NOTE
$80f000.00

Salt Lake City, Utah
May 2 ^ 1 9 8 4

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers") promise
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited
partnership ("Properties'1), or its assigns, the principal sura of
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10
1/22) p^r annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The
entire principal balance.and all accrued interest shall be due
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994.
Contemporaneous with Makers9 execution of this Note,
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement,
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand*from and against, for,
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith,
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor.
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at
the time and in the manner required, Properties, at its option
and without rtbtice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and

the leasing.of any and a l l portions of the Center to-.Tarants for
purposes of Occupancy by Tenants
whether incurred with or without s u i t or oexore or a f t e r
Judgment, l a d u d i n t reasonable attorneya* f e e t ) which say bo
incurrad by or i n connection with the enforcement or performance
of any of the righta 'of Properties hereunder or undar any
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related t o
t h i s Vote. Zf principal or i n t e r e a t owing hereunder ara not paid
when due, intereat s h a l l t h e r e a f t e r accrue oa the unpaid
p r i n c i p a l balance at the rate of e i g h t e e n percent (181) per
annum, both before and a f t e r Judgment. The e n t i r e balanee of
principal and intereat owing hereunder s h a l l mature and be
payable i n the event of aale or t r a n s f e r by Makers of a l l or any
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Canter located i n
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that {\ykti4.

.
Alk/j
/jOf/l

tft/tf?f/fanftip%
(2) tho transfer of a l l or any portion of the
Center to a corporation, partnership or other e n t i t y which i s
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a l i n e a l descendant hV
ett44*v?£'of
Makera or any one of them, 44 (3) the transfer t o a
spouse, o z lineal descendant ui •iiiieaiur of a Maker or to a t r u s t
naming a Maker or a spouseprlineal descendant AWM^ftAV of a
Maker aa a beneficiary, *shall not be deemed to accelerate the
maturity data for payment of p r i n c i p a l and intereat owing
hereunder. The term "control** means ownership of more than £ x f £ $ f a * hun
pereent 630Z)
of the c a p i t a l of a. partnership or unincorporated / ;Jlr\//
/\//
"entity orwvttie ownership of more than rMUAfH. pareent (JJMT.) of a l l AlL^(/',
c l a s s e s of stock of a corporation.
° Amazed
ISO!
^
Presentment for payment, p r o t e s t and notice of p r o t e s t
and of non-payment of t h i s Note are hereby waived.
In the event Fropertiee deterainea that i t w i l l s e l l or
discount t h i s Hots, and i f Makers are not then i n default
hereunder, then Properties s h a l l o f f e r the right to Makers to
purchase t h i s Note on the same terms aet forth in said of far.
This Mote i s executed i n connection with and pursuant
to the terms of the l e t t e r agreement above-mentioned and c e r t a i n
other written agreements entered i n t o between Makers, Fropertiee
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated i n t o
and by reference made a part of t h i s Note.
v
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at the closing of such sale if, but only if,
/ >i
xf

V % *the leasing of &\7\ purposes of occu r

and all portions or trieK/
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whether incurred with or without suit or before or after
judgment* including reasonable attorneys' fees) which may be
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to
this Note. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid
when due, interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any
portion of the ,fCommonwealth Square Shopping Center located in
J
Sunset, Utah ( the Center"), provided, however, that (l)**l*e
^ V
tgoasfeg ef leaceheld interests by Mahegs of all eg any perfcien
of the Center, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant «*?
ancestor of Makers or any one of them, •» (3) the transfer to a
spouse^f lineal descendant eg ancestor of a Maker or to a trust
naming a Maker or a spous%r,/ lineal descendant er aneestec of a
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing
hereunder. The term "control" means ownership of more than fiffeyone* hund
percent (5^) 1 8r*the capital of a partnership or unincorporated
entity or the ownership of more than/fifty percent (5-95J) of all 2rffclasses of stock of a corporation, one hundred
100%
j
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived.
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default
hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer.
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into
and by reference made a part of this Note.
VAL BAN CORP.f a California
corporation
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**the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided,
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however, that Makers shall pav Properties $10,000.00 at the closing
v H
of such sale if, but only if>"the price for such Unit 18 equals or

Bernie Goler

Bonnie Goler
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